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DOES ISRAEL HAVE A CONSTITUTION?* 
THE HONORABLE DALIA DORNER** 
1. As with every country, Israel has a material constitution, meaning 
governing arrangements that are anchored in legal norms that establish the 
branches of government - the legislative branch, the executive branch and the 
judiciary - and the relationships among them.  The question is whether Israel 
also has a formal constitution: a norm that is superior to regular legislation so 
that if the laws and the constitution conflict, the provisions of the constitution 
will be preferred.  A second question that arises asks which branch is 
authorized to determine the constitutionality of ordinary legislation. 
2. From the outset of the establishment of the State, a formal constitution 
was anticipated.  The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel 
(hereafter the Declaration of Independence) promises that a formal 
Constitution would be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly no later 
than October 1, 1948.  A formal Constitution was among the criteria discussed 
by the United Nations and favored in a United Nations decision of November 
29, 1947.  However, the plan of drafting a comprehensive written constitution 
for the State of Israel was never realized. 
The Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel provides guiding 
principles for the State of Israel.  It articulates the basis for a human rights 
charter that serves as a backdrop for the Basic Laws and all ordinary 
legislation.  According to the Declaration of Independence, the State of Israel 
“will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of 
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Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its 
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education  and culture.” 
Because of constant threats to Israel’s security, Israel adopted Emergency 
Regulations and considered itself in a state of emergency,  conditions that 
complicated the drafting and adoption of a formal Constitution.  In addition, 
the religious community viewed the Torah, or Jewish law, as paramount and 
thus the notion of  a supreme law embodied by the Constitution threatened to 
offend this segment of the population.  Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was 
among the most famous opponents to the adoption of a constitution.  He did 
not dispute the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution, but argued that the 
Knesset was not required to do so immediately and that it had the power to 
postpone the adoption of a constitution until a later date. 
In 1950, a compromise was reached that managed to preserve a number of 
options.  This compromise, the Harari Resolution, established that Israel’s 
formal constitution would be drafted in a piecemeal fashion through the 
adoption of a series of Basic Laws.  According to the Harari Resolution, these 
Basic Laws would ultimately be unified as the Constitution of the State of 
Israel.  Thus the principle of a formal Constitution was preserved, while it was 
accepted that it would not have to be drafted as a single unified document from 
the beginning.  Instead, articles of the Constitution could be adopted in the 
form of Basic Laws. 
In reality, the principles of the bill of rights contained in the Declaration of 
Independence were not granted constitutional status, and the recognition of 
human rights – those of liberty, equality, freedom of expression and 
occupation, freedom of conscience and religion - as fundamental norms of 
Israeli law was a creation of the Supreme Court.  The Court held that although 
legislation cannot be invalidated on the basis of the Declaration of 
Independence, all laws of Israel, including those enacted during the British 
Mandate before the establishment of the State, must be interpreted in light of 
the principles expressed by the Declaration. 
The basic principle concerning freedom of expression in Israel was first 
established in the famous Kol Ha’am case.  The rule provides that the right to 
free expression cannot be restricted unless the following concurrent conditions 
are met: (i) the explicit authorization of primary legislation; (ii) near certainty, 
or at least a reasonable likelihood, that the realization of the freedom of 
expression will harm an important interest; and (iii) that the harm to the 
interest will be actual and severe.  On the basis of this rule, the Court ordered 
the police to allow demonstrations in situations in which a fear existed but did 
not reach the level of proximate danger to the public peace.  In addition, the 
Court intervened against government decisions to restrict freedom of 
expression even when the expression was hurtful, offensive, or disgusting. 
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In the area of equality, judicial decisions established the principle that, in 
the absence of a legislative directive to the contrary, the government 
authorities must conduct themselves in an egalitarian or non-discriminatory 
manner.  Discrimination is cause for the invalidation of an administrative 
decision, and the law will be interpreted, to the extent possible, in accordance 
with the principle of equality.  On the basis of these rules, discriminatory 
decisions were invalidated, including those based on group membership (such 
as sex, race, religion, etc.) and those based on administrative or political 
rationales.1 
3. The legal principles that anchored these human rights can also be 
considered part of Israel’s constitution.  Yet, these norms applied only to the 
administrative bodies.  The power of the Knesset to legislate remained 
completely unrestricted.  Indeed, over the years,  eleven Basic Laws were 
enacted: Basic Law: the Knesset, Basic Law: Lands of Israel, Basic Law: The 
President, Basic Law: National Economy, Basic Law: The Army, Basic Law: 
Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, Basic Law: State Comptroller, Basic Law: The 
Government, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Liberty.  Only the last two Basic Laws, enacted in 1992, deal with human 
rights.  The primary legislation of the two is Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty. 
The rights were defined in the two Basic Laws in absolute terms: 
The life, body or dignity of any person shall not be violated.2 
A person’s property shall not be infringed.3 
Every person is entitled to protection of his life, body and dignity.4 
The liberty of a person shall not be deprived or restricted through 
imprisonment, detention, extradition or in any other manner.5 
Every Israeli citizen is entitled to enter Israel.6 
Every person is entitled to privacy and to the confidentiality of his life.7 
Every Israel national or resident has the right to engage in any occupation, 
profession or trade.8 
 
 1. H.C. 25/53, Koh Ha’am Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7(1) P.D. 165. 
 2. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 2, 1992, S.H. 1391. 
 3. Id. at § 3. 
 4. Id. at § 4. 
 5. Id. at § 5. 
 6. Id. at § 6. 
 7. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 7, 1992, S.H. 1391. 
 8. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, § 3, 1992, S.H. 1391. 
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Alongside these rights that are defined in absolute terms, the authority to 
limit them is defined in the Basic Laws.  Human rights are not absolute but 
relative, and their parameters are derived from the balance between them and 
other principles that society has an interest to protect.  In the United States, the 
Constitution is silent as to the manner of balancing human rights, and thus the 
determination is left to the Supreme Court.  In Israel, the Basic Laws, like 
many other constitutions, contain a Limitation Clause.  The following language 
of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty explains the limitation: 
There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law 
befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to 
an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of 
express authorization in such Law.9 
This provision must be read in conjunction with the Declaration of Purpose 
in Section 1 of the Basic Law, which defines the values of the State as those of 
a Jewish and democratic state. 
4. Because of difficulties in reaching a national consensus and fears of the 
religious parties concerning a change in the status quo according to which 
there is no separation between religion and State, and because the authority to 
determine issues concerning marriage and divorce is in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts, the Basic Laws included provisions that 
grant force to legislation enacted prior to these Basic Laws.  In addition, the 
two most recent Basic Laws, according to the stated intent of the Knesset, 
reflect a political compromise and national consensus concerning specific 
rights.  Thus the Basic Laws do not include central rights such as the principle 
of equality, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, conscience and 
information.  To this day, the Knesset has not enacted a Basic Law: Legislation 
that establishes the superiority of the Basic Laws over ordinary legislation and 
the authority of the courts to review the constitutionality of legislation.  The 
Basic Laws are not sufficiently entrenched, and most of the Basic Laws, 
including the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is the central law 
concerning the protection of human rights, can be changed by an ordinary 
majority of votes in the Knesset. 
5. The argument has been made that the Basic Laws can be defined as lex 
imperfecto and that they determine principles that cannot be implemented in 
practice.  There are those who believe that Basic Laws that were enacted by an 
ordinary majority of Knesset cannot be considered a constitution.10 
6.  This position was rejected by the Supreme Court of Israel. 
 
 9. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, 1992, S.H. 1391. 
 10. Ruth Gavison, The Constitutional Revolution – A Description of Reality or Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy, 38 MISHPATIM 21 (1997). 
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Already in 1969, in the Bergman case,11 the Supreme Court held that the 
Knesset has the ability to limit itself through an entrenched clause in a Basic 
Law, and that the Court is authorized to invalidate an ordinary statute that 
contradicts such a provision.  Indeed, in the same decision, the Court 
intentionally avoided ruling on “weighty preliminary questions of a 
constitutional nature, relating to the status of the Basic Laws, and to the 
justiciability before this court of the issue of the Knesset’s actual compliance 
with a self-imposed limitation .”12  These questions were decided by a panel of 
nine judges in the case of Bank Mizrachi following the enactment of the Basic 
Laws.13 
In the Bank Mizrachi decision, in establishing unanimously that the Court 
has the authority to review the constitutionality of legislation, the Supreme 
Court of Israel followed the law of the United States.  In the United States, as 
in Israel and in contrast to other countries such as Canada, the Constitution has 
no explicit provision authorizing courts to determine the constitutionality of 
ordinary legislation.14 
In the United States, the power of the Supreme Court to determine the 
constitutionality of acts of other branches of government is a basic element of 
the system of government.  However, this has not always been the case.  An 
examination of the history of the United States Supreme Court reveals the 
Court’s continuing effort to establish and maintain the power of the judiciary.  
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall established the principle that 
the Constitution is a superior form of law and that the Court is the body to 
determine whether a statute is inconsistent with this law.  Chief Justice 
Marshall established that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”15 
7.  According to the Israeli constitutional structure, questions of 
constitutionality are decided by the judiciary.  Therefore, in the absence of 
another arrangement in the law, the authority to review the validity of a statute 
is granted to all courts or tribunals.  The decision of a judicial body other than 
the Supreme Court will, by the nature of things, be limited to the specific case 
before it.  However, a decision of the Supreme Court, the court of highest 
instance whose decisions are binding precedents, can in fact invalidate a law 
that is unconstitutional. 
In my opinion, criticism of the Court as having seized authority for itself is 
unfounded.  The assertion that the Limitation Clause is of declarative force 
 
 11. H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693. 
 12. Id. at 696. 
 13. C.A. 6821/93, Unified Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Village, 49(4) P.D. 221. 
 14. See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), § 24(1). 
 15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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only is negated by the explicit provision preserving the force of all statutes 
enacted prior to the Basic Law.  Such a provision would have been completely 
superfluous had it been impossible to invalidate legislation that failed to pass 
the tests of the Limitations Clause. 
8.   In Bank Mizrachi, a majority of the Court held that the Basic Laws are 
enacted by the Knesset as the Constitutional Authority of Israel, and that the 
Basic Laws enjoy a superior normative status as compared with ordinary 
legislation, which is enacted by the Knesset in its role as the Legislative Body 
of Israel.  The Knesset is not authorized to enact statutes other than those that 
befit the provisions of the Basic Laws.  Therefore, when a conflict arises 
between a provision of a Basic Law and a provision of a statute that precludes 
the fulfillment of both simultaneously, the provision of the Basic Law will be 
favored as it enjoys a higher normative status than legislative provisions. 
It becomes clear that the Basic Laws of Israel that are our formal 
constitution are also rigid or entrenched in the sense that an ordinary statute 
passed by the Knesset cannot infringe upon them unless the Basic law itself 
contains an express provision to that effect. 
9. As discussed earlier, the Basic Laws fail to acknowledge central human 
rights, and there are those who believe that all the rights not explicitly 
mentioned - the principle of equality, freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion and conscience - can be included in the right to dignity.  In this way, it 
is argued, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty can be transformed into 
a complete Bill of Rights. 
I doubt whether it is possible, and in any case appropriate, to interpret the 
Basic Law as protecting rights that are not mentioned in the Law, when the 
clear intent of the legislator was to refrain from anchoring such rights in the 
Basic Law in the absence of a national consensus.  At the same time, even if 
rights are not added through interpretation of the Law, there is no reasonable 
way to interpret the right to dignity such that degradation of an individual 
would not be considered an infringement of the right protected by the Basic 
Law. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty protects against a harm that 
leads to degradation, that is a harm to a human being that goes to the essence 
of his or her personhood.  In this way, the Basic Law protects the principle of 
equality, when an individual is discriminated against on the basis of gender, 
race or religion16 and the freedom of expression, religion and conscience, and 
scientific creation from statutes that limit the personal fulfillment of a human 
being.17 
10.  As I explained earlier, human rights anchored in the Basic Laws can be 
limited according to the measuring principles established by the Limitation 
 
 16. H.C. 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Defense P.D. 59(4) 94, 131-32. 
 17. Cr. A. 4409/94 Golan v. Prison Services 40(4) P.D. 136, 190. 
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Clause which include four elements: authorization by Law, a proper purpose, 
proportionality, and befitting the values of the State of Israel. 
The first element reflects the Constitutional Principle that requires an 
infringement of a right to be authorized explicitly by Law or through explicit 
consent. 
11.  The element concerning a proper purpose requires that the 
infringement of a right be for a purpose that serves a public goal that could 
justify an infringement of a fundamental right in a democratic system. 
12.  The most important element is that the degree of harm to the right be 
no greater than required to attain the goal.  This is the Proportionality 
Requirement, conformity with which is expressed through three balancing 
tests: the suitability of the means to the goal; the adoption of a means that 
infringes upon a fundamental right only as a last resort and for lack of any 
other reasonable means; and the adoption of a means that harms a right only in 
a case in which the objective is sufficiently important and the harm that would 
result from not pursuing such an objective justifies the harm to the 
fundamental right. 
As for these balancing tests, it must be emphasized that no one of these 
tests is absolute.  First, ordinarily, the legislative branch has discretion in 
applying the balancing tests.  That is, it is enough that the legislator have a 
feasible view that the means chosen suit the purpose, or that the right is 
infringed to the smallest extent possible in achieving the purpose, or that the 
harm to the right necessary to achieve the goal is reasonable.  According to the 
accepted terminology of administrative law, the legislator’s view must be 
within the “margin of reasonableness” in order for the law to meet the 
proportionality requirement.  Second, as part of the first balancing test, the 
suitability of the means to the goal, an absolute certainty that the means will 
achieve their purpose is not required.  It is enough that there is a high 
probability that the goal will be achieved through the use of the chosen means.  
The degree of probability required will depend on the relative importance of 
the right being harmed and the purpose of the infringement.  Third, the second 
balancing test, which requires that rights be infringed upon only as a last resort, 
does not obligate the Knesset to chose means that do not infringe upon a right 
or which curb the infringement at any cost.  The public resources are by the 
nature of things limited.  Despite the unquestionable importance of individual 
rights, it is not possible, nor appropriate to prefer their fulfillment absolutely 
over all other public interests.  Thus, for example, it is possible to prevent 
suspects in all cases from endangering the public through “house arrest” under 
the auspices of the police.  However, it is, at times, impossible to disregard the 
possibility of achieving the same goal by the less expensive means of detention 
in prison, even though such a measure infringes upon the rights of the suspect 
far more than house arrest would.  Further, there are various levels at which a 
goal can be attained.  Sometimes, a lesser harm of a right can enable a greater 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1332 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1325 
realization of the goal.  Therefore, it is sufficient that the Knesset reasonably 
consider, in light of the circumstances, the minimization of the harm to a right. 
In my opinion, it is appropriate that in applying all three of these balancing 
tests, the substance of the right potentially harmed will be taken into account. 
13.  This concept  is recognized in other countries and by the administrative 
Law in Israel. 
In the United States, different levels of scrutiny were developed to test the 
constitutionality of statutes that infringe upon civil rights.  These levels of 
scrutiny depend on the degree of importance of the values and interests 
underlying each right.  At the bottom of the hierarchy of rights are economic 
rights.  An infringement of such a right will be justified if it is reasonably 
related to a legitimate public interest.18  At the top of the ladder are overriding 
rights with special status, such as the right to participate in elections, freedom 
of expression and freedom of movement.  An infringement of such rights is 
allowed only to serve a compelling state interest that cannot be realized by less 
intrusive means.19 
In Israel, when we are confronted by a harm to a right executed by an 
administrative body, we balance the substance of the right, the specific weight 
and the rationale at the root of the right on one side against the importance of 
the interest conflicting with the right, on the other.20 
The degree of importance attributed to a right in the balancing framework 
in which the constitutionality of the infringement will be examined is likely to 
change from case to case pursuant to the values and interests harmed in the 
specific circumstances.  Thus, for example, harm to an individual is not the 
equivalent of a harm to many people or to the public in general. 
This approach applies to all three of the balancing tests. 
Concerning the test of whether the means chosen suit the objective, the 
degree of certainty required in matching the means to the goal and concerning 
its effectiveness is influenced by the importance of the right and its underlying 
reasons.  When dealing with rights of great importance, the standard will be 
one of “near certainty,” and possibly nearly absolute certainty, that the means 
by which a right is infringed upon will enable the efficient and complete 
realization of the goal.  In contrast, when a less weighty right is considered, it 
is possible that a “reasonable possibility” of realizing the goal will suffice. 
As for the requirement that the means chosen be the least harmful to the 
right in question, which is clearly not an absolute test, the choice of means will 
be affected by the nature of the right being infringed.  When considering the 
infringement of an especially important fundamental right, we must be stricter 
 
 18. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 366 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 20. See, e.g., H.C. 399/85, Kahane v. Executive Board of the Broadcasting Authority, 41(3) 
P.D. 255, 284. 
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in our choice of the least restrictive means, even if such a means is expensive.  
The law will differ in cases in which the right in question is of lesser weight.  
Protection of such a right will not require the State to adopt especially 
burdensome means. 
As concerns the test of balancing between the benefit resulting from 
attainment of the goal and the harm of the means by which it is attained, such a 
test will take into account, as is the case with administrative bodies, the nature 
of the right in question, the underlying rationales and the values and interests 
harmed in the specific case. 
14.  The element concerning the values of the State of Israel requires that 
the infringement of a right befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state.  Interpretation of this provision is by no means simple.  Even 
though the meaning of democratic principles may be clear to all, the question 
remains as to how to interpret the principles of a Jewish state and how to 
resolve a possible conflict between the two sets of values.  The Supreme Court 
has not yet been confronted directly with this question.  A number of opinions 
have been expressed concerning this issue. 
It is clear that the segment of Israeli society that supports a Halachic State, 
or a state run on the basis of Jewish religious law, believe that the principles of 
the Jewish state are those of adherence to Jewish religious law, which should 
prevail when in conflict with democratic principles.  One Israeli Supreme 
Court Justice expressed the opinion that when confronted with a number of 
approaches compatible with a democratic value, we must prefer the approach 
most in agreement with principles expressed in the Jewish religious law.  In 
this way, it is argued, we should synthesize democratic and Jewish principles.21 
Another Supreme Court Justice expressed the belief that the Jewish values 
of the State of Israel are the values shared by Judaism and democracy: respect 
for your fellow being, the sanctity of life, social justice, preservation of human 
dignity and such values that Judaism has always imparted.22 
Another argument asserted in academia is that the bi-principled mandate of 
a Jewish and democratic state broadens the protection of human rights.  The 
Limitation Clause of the Basic Law does not specify when rights can be 
conferred and Jewish law does not recognize all human rights.  As such, it is 
enough that legislation infringes on either democratic or Jewish principles so 
as to make it an invalid infringement on human rights.  According to this view, 
a Law which violates rights under the Basic Law, that befits the principles of 
the State as a democracy, but does not befit the principles of a Jewish state 
cannot be enacted by the Knesset.  And vice versa.  Such a Law cannot be 
enacted if it befits the values of a Jewish state but does not befit the principles 
 
 21. C.A. 294/93, Burial Society of Jerusalem v. Kestenbaum, 46(2) P.D. 464, 511. 
 22. Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT 
UMIMSHAL 9, 30-31 (1992-1993). 
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of the state as a democracy.  This approach requires that the principles of a 
Jewish state that protect human rights should be interpreted broadly so as to 
widen the protection of human rights by the Basic Laws.23 
15.  In my opinion, a suitable interpretation must create a harmony between 
democratic and Jewish values.  The State of Israel is a state governed by law 
and not on the basis of Jewish religious precepts.  Therefore the principles of a 
Jewish state are not identical to the principles of Jewish religious law.  Instead, 
these Jewish values are those that were at the basis of the establishment of the 
State of Israel - the Zionism that led to the establishment of the State, the 
Hebrew language, the observance of holidays and days of rest according to the 
Jewish calendar, and most importantly the “principles of liberty, justice, equity 
and peace of the heritage of Israel” according to which the courts must also 
decide legal questions for which there are no answers in the legislation, case 
law, or by analogy.24  These principles also befit the democratic character of 
the State.  Thus there is nothing about the bi-principled mandate of the Basic 
Law that limits rights more than is necessary in a democratic system. 
The United States Declaration of Independence reads: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
However, over the course of many years, the Supreme Court of the United 
States ignored the discrimination against Afro-American individuals, and even 
granted legitimacy to slavery in the Dredd Scott case. Without the 
internalization of values by society, a constitution is not enough.  Still, the 
declaration that “all men are created equal” continued to plague the American 
conscience and in the end, led to changes in the law and society.  The poet 
Robert Frost expressed it well:25 
That’s a hard mystery of Jefferson’s. 
What did he mean? Of course the easy way 
Is to decide it simply isn’t true. 
It may not be.  I heard a fellow say so. 
But never mind, the Welshman got it planted 
Where it will trouble us a thousand years. 
Each age will have to reconsider it. 
History proves, therefore, that the realization of a true democracy, as 
opposed to a formal democracy, requires the support and completion of the 
constitution by additional values, among them the obligation to treat all 
 
 23. Ariel Bendor, Defects in the Enactment of Basic Laws, 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 443, 443-
52 (1994). 
 24. Foundations of Law Statute, 1980, S.H. 978. 
 25. See  Simon Greenberg, Judaism and the Democratic Ideal, DEMOCRATIC CULTURE, 
(Avi Sagi & Yedida Stern, eds. 1999) at 189. 
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individuals equally, and to take responsibility for the fate of another.  These 
values can be found in the heritage of Israel.  The Talmud states: 
For this reason, Adam was created an individual, to teach you that one who 
causes the loss of one life is considered to have caused the loss of an entire 
world; and one who saves a life is considered to have saved an entire world. 
The synthesis between Jewish values, as I understand them, and 
democratic principles eases the internalization of democratic principles on the 
part of Israeli society and strengthens them. 
16.   On the basis of these principles, the Supreme Court of Israel 
invalidates provisions of a law that infringe upon the freedom of occupation.26  
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that infringed 
upon the right to property as it determined that the infringement withstood the 
tests of the Limitation Clause. 
17.  Indeed, Israel’s formal constitution is unfinished.  It still needs to be 
completed through the enactment of additional Basic Laws and further 
entrenchment.  I hope that the Knesset, as the legislative branch, will complete 
its endeavor.  Yet, even in its unfinished state, the Constitution expressed by 
the Basic Laws enjoys full normative force and superiority over ordinary 
legislation.  And even in the existing constitutional framework, the Basic Laws 
can be enforced through judicial review. 
 
 26. H.C. 1715/97, The Bureau of Investment Advisors in Israel v. The Minister of Finance, 
51(4) P.D. 367. 
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